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What is meant by uncertainty? Presumably it is a term that has been used in a
variety of ways. The present article focuses on some of the interesting relations
between uncertainty and both pragmatist philosophy and rational choice the-
ory. Section 2 is concerned primarily with the ways that uncertainty has been
accommodated in the study of rational choice and, in particular, the ways in
which attempts to accommodate uncertainty have motivated departures from
the orthodox Bayesian tradition that finds its roots in the work of Ramsey and
Savage. Section 3 is concerned primarily with the ways that the aforementioned
departures from the orthodox Bayesian tradition can be seen as arising from a
commitment to pragmatist principles of the sort that are developed in the work
of Peirce and Levi.
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For the purposes of the present article, the meaning of the term decision theory
will be restricted to a cluster of topics that concern synchronic standards of
single-agent rationality as reflected in principles of rational choice. The devel-
opment of expected utility theory forms the backbone of the intended cluster of
topics. The following three remarks are meant to further clarify the suggested
restrictions:
First, we are restricting to single-agent standards, as opposed to standards
of rationality concerning groups of agents that might interact with each other
in various ways. This is not meant to suggest that there are no interesting
developments relating to standards that are concerned with groups of agents,
quite the contrary. Rather, it is because there is such great variety in these
developments. Much of this variety results from the fact that so many different
kinds of assumptions have been made concerning the relevant group of agents,
e.g., that they are in competition with each other or perhaps that certain in-
formation is salient to every member of the group. As a result, many of these
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developments now constitute large and well-defined subfields of rational choice
theory, e.g., game theory and theories of social choice. Note, however, that much
of what will be considered in the present article is presupposed in discussions of
multi-agent contexts. Thus, the reader is advised not to conclude that there is
no significant interaction between decision theory and a topic like game theory
[14, 34].
Second, we are restricting to synchronic standards of rationality. This is
because developments concerning diachronic standards typically depend cru-
cially on theories of updating – e.g., Bayesian updating – that can be studied
somewhat independently of decision theory in connection with topics like the
confirmation of hypotheses. Again, the reader should not conclude that the
topics covered in the present article are unrelated to diachronic standards of ra-
tional choice, since these standards typically presuppose many of the synchronic
principles that will be considered in what follows.
Third, we will be focusing on a particular expected utility tradition, one
that is perhaps most closely associated with the work of Savage as presented
in [36]. It seems clear that the tradition exemplified by Savage’s work is the
expected utility tradition that is most well-known to economists, psychologists,
and statisticians. However, the situation in philosophy is a bit different, since
philosophers often draw upon the expected utility tradition that is perhaps most
clearly associated with the work of Jeffrey as presented in [12]. The present
focus on the tradition associated with Savage is not meant to suggest that the
tradition associated with Jeffrey is less significant. Rather, the choice of focus
is in recognition of the fact that discussions of Jeffrey’s approach are often
held in the context of other well-developed topics in the philosophy of decision
theory – e.g., debates between evidential and causal decision theories [13] –
as well as philosophical topics that can be pursued somewhat independently
of decision theory, e.g., the assignment of probability to conditionals. Once
again, the reader is urged not to conclude that the present article is irrelevant
to the philosophical tradition that has just been described, since many of the
relevant discussions – e.g., [13] – are informed by the Savage tradition despite
their departures from it.
Even with its scope restricted in the manner that has just been described,
the study of decision making is relevant to a variety of fields – e.g., economics
[7, 45], philosophy [12, 24], psychology [16, 6], and statistics [36, 15] – and it
seems reasonable to assume that many people are interested in certain kinds
of decisions – e.g., financial decisions – but these considerations do not imply
that there are any interesting theories of decision. For it may be that all of the
interesting aspects of decision making are so highly contextual that they resist
non-trivial theorizing. Presumably, non-trivial theories must have some sort of
relevance. There are at least three ways in which a given theory of decision
might be relevant [18]. It might be normatively relevant, providing a standard
with which decisions ought to agree. It might be prescriptively relevant, provid-
ing techniques to improve decision making. It might be descriptively relevant,
providing a basis for explaining and predicting the behavior of decision makers.
There are various potential dependencies among these three sorts of relevance:
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It might be expected of a prescriptively relevant theory that it will help to
bring decision makers in line with the demands of a certain normatively rele-
vant theory. It might be expected of a normatively relevant theory that it be
descriptively relevant in at least some situations, e.g., those involving sophisti-
cated decision makers in situations where the “cognitive load” does not impose
too much of a burden on the decision maker’s computational capacities.
In addition to questions concerning the way in which a theory of decision
might be relevant, there are questions concerning the structure of such a theory.
For example, what is required in order for a thing to qualify as a presentation
of such a theory? Perhaps there are various things - e.g., metaphors, diagrams,
or equations - that could figure into such a presentation. Our focus in the
present article is on “formal” theories. Such theories serve to determine a class
of structures, e.g., the models of the theory. In this sense such theories may be
viewed as part of ordinary mathematics, like group theory or topology. However,
the theories at issue are not primarily of interest as pure mathematics. The
central interest, as is typical in emerging field of formal epistemology [10, 11],
concerns the relevance of these structures to the world in which decisions are
made [42, 44]. A given formal theory might be relevant in more than one of
the ways mentioned above, but some of these ways might be regarded as more
compelling than others; e.g., optimization of transitive preferences might count
as having some sort of normative relevance, even if, in light of empirical evidence,
it is not regarded as having great descriptive relevance.
Of the three notions of relevance that have been mentioned, it seems clear
that normative concerns have dominated philosophical discussions of decision
theory. This is not surprising, since norms of decision making serve to circum-
scribe some important aspect of rationality, a traditional topic of interest for
philosophers. Such interest in rationality is often predicated on the thesis that
agents ought to be rational, where the term rational denotes some suitably ar-
ticulated standard for individual agents; for example, taking the term to mean
expected utility maximizer yields the idea that agents ought to be expected
utility maximizers. But why make such an assumption? Although a detailed
examination of this sort of question is not appropriate for the present survey,
a few brief remarks are in order. Hence, one possible justification for such an
assumption is that there are reasons to believe that it is true. Such a justifica-
tion requires that statements like “agents ought to be rational” are truth-value
bearing, a matter that is hardly clear: Is the truth-value of such a statement
contingent upon the facts of the world? If so, then what can be said about the
empirical content of a statement like “agents ought to be rational”? In contrast,
if such statements are not contingent, then are they to be construed as necessary
in some sense? If so, then what can be said about the principles of logic that
will underwrite such necessity? This line of attack threatens to drag us into a
Russian winter of old and difficult philosophical questions.
In contrast to that which was just considered, a rather different conception
of the thesis at issue couches the discussion in terms of agent-relative notions
rather than categorical ones. For example, it might be suggested that an agent
who is committed to being rational is an agent who ought to be rational, on
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pain of failing to live up to its commitments. The idea that one should desire to
live up to ones commitments is taken here as constitutive of the very concept of
having a commitment. The suggested move to commitments, and reactions to
it, might be compared to those that are associated with certain aspects of the
pragmaticist tradition in epistemology, where, following Peirce, the “fixation
of belief” is central and concerns with the “pedigree of knowledge” play a less
substantial role [31, 24, 28]. In both contexts, an agent-relative concept – e.g.,
commitments or beliefs – is taken to provide a sufficient foundation for further
investigations into rational choice in general and epistemology in particular.
To be sure, a move to commitments raises its own questions, with the first
of these concerning the conditions that must be satisfied for there to be such
commitments. One sort of answer to such questions maintains that whether or
not a commitment is in place is a matter of psychological fact, although perhaps
one that is only accessible through introspection. Savage’s remarks concerning
the status of his own subjective expected utility theory as presented in The
Foundations of Statistics, which is perhaps still the most influential book on
decision theory, are worth recalling in connection with answers of the sort that
was just described:
I am about to build up a highly idealized theory of the behavior of
a “rational” person with respect to decisions. In doing so I will, of
course, have to ask you to agree with me that such and such maxims
of behavior are “rational.” In so far as “rational” means logical,
there is no live question; and, if I ask your leave there at all, it is
only as a matter of form. But our person is going to have to make
up his mind in situations in which criteria beyond the ordinary ones
of logic will be necessary. So, when certain maxims are presented
for your consideration, you must ask yourself whether you try to
behave in accordance with them, or, to put it differently, how you
would react if you noticed yourself violating them. [36]
The essence of Savage’s position, as presented in the quoted passage, appears
to be that the agent can introspect and determine if it is committed to the
standard at issue. For example, following the suggestion made at the end of
Savage’s remarks, the agent has a commitment to a given standard at time t if
at t the agent judges that it would seek appropriate therapy upon noticing itself
violating that standard. Note that on such a view an agent who is committed
to a given standard at t might not satisfy that standard at t – the committed
agent is of course obliged to seek therapy when it notices that it has failed to
live up to its commitment, but that is a different matter. For example, an agent
that is committed to Savage’s theory could very well have weak preferences
that are incompatible with that theory. However, so long as that commitment
is in place, such an agent is obliged to take steps towards eliminating those
incompatibilities when they are recognized by that agent [24].
As discussed, decision theory, at least in its more formal branches, has been
concerned with the problem of articulating standards of rational choice and,
minimally, such standards serve to determine a class of structures. Let us now
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focus matters by considering the case of optimization, a standard that is as-
sumed in much of contemporary decision theory. Roughly, an optimizing agent
is one that, if offered a menu of alternatives, would constrain its selection to an
alternative that it weakly prefers to all of the other alternatives on the given
menu. Assuming a set of alternatives, and of which the menus of alternatives
are subsets, and where weak preference on a menu is representable as a binary
relation on that set, optimization might be seen as determining a subclass of
those structures of type ￿A,M,P, C￿ where A is a nonempty set, M is a subset
of the set of all subsets of A, P is a function that associates each M ∈M with
a binary relation on M , and C is a function that associates each M ∈M with a
subset of M . The intended interpretation of these components being as follows:
A is the set of alternatives; M is the set of all potential menus; and P assigns
each menu to the binary relation that represents the agent’s weak preferences on
that menu. The final component, C, assigns each menu to the set of admissible
alternatives on that menu – we will return to this notion later, but the basic
idea is that the admissible alternatives are those that can be selected in a way
that satisfies the standard to which the agent is committed.
With the relevant type of structure determined, optimization can be formu-
lated more precisely as follows: ￿A,M,P, C￿ is an optimization structure just in
case, for all menus M , C(M) is the set of all those alternatives x in M such that
(x, y) ∈ P(M) for all y in M . This formulation of optimization is rather weak,
and there is a tradition of restricting to cases in which additional requirements
are met. For example, it is often required that C(M) is nonempty whenever M
is nonempty – i.e., that each nonempty menu contain at least one admissible
alternative – and this, of course, further constrains P in light of the quasi-formal
statement of optimization that has just been given. In fact, there are at least
two other general constraints that are imposed on P in typical formulations of
optimization [38, 22, 35]. First, it is assumed that P(M) must be a weak order
if it is to represent a rational agent’s weak preferences over M [32]. Second, it
is assumed that for rational agents P is given by restriction in the sense that
if M ⊆ M ￿, then P(M) is the restriction of P(M ￿) to M . This assumption of
menu-independence is often strengthened so as to guarantee the existence of a
weak order P on A such that, for each menu M , P(M) is the restriction of P
to M [40].
It is well-known that under standard assumptions – roughly the two sorts of
constraints just mentioned – the P component of an optimization structure is de-
finable from its remaining components. For example, suppose that ￿A,M,P, C￿
is an optimization structure that satisfies the two sorts of constraints that have
been mentioned and for which M is the set of all subsets of a finite, nonempty
A. It can be shown that for such an optimization structure the global pref-
erence P , which is assumed to represent P by virtue of satisfying the second
constraint from the previous paragraph, can be recovered from C as (x, y) ∈ P
iff x ∈ C({x, y}). Hence, optimization structures can also be regarded as a sub-
class of those structures of type ￿A,M, C￿, where, as before, A is a nonempty
set of alternatives, M is the set of all potential menus from A, and C is a func-
tion that associates each menu M with a set of admissible alternatives from
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M . Under standard assumptions – e.g., M consists of all finite subsets of A –
the optimization structures can be viewed as those structures of type ￿A,M, C￿
that satisfy Sen’s α and β conditions. α requires that if M and M ￿ are menus
such that M ⊆ M ￿ and x is an alternative in M that is also admissible in M ￿
– i.e., x ∈ M ∩ C(M ￿) – then x is admissible in M . β requires that if M and
M ￿ are menus such that M ⊆M ￿ and both x and y are admissible alternatives
in M , then either both of those alternatives are admissible in M ￿ or neither of
them are admissible in M ￿ [38, 22].
Optimization is often taken as a necessary principle of rational choice, but
it is seldom taken as a sufficient one. In particular, it seems reasonable to
many that a rational agent is, minimally, one that is disposed to restrict its
selection to those alternatives that, given its beliefs, best serve its desires, but
it is clear that the more general conception of optimization does not impose
such a requirement since the weak preferences being optimized are not required
to have any connection with the agent’s beliefs or desires. The requirement at
issue needs to be made more precise if it is to do any heavy lifting. Various
questions arise concerning what is meant by beliefs and desires as well as the
sense in which some alternatives “best serve” relative to such beliefs and desires.
The most influential answers to these questions have come from the expected
utility tradition [22]. According to the simplest theories from this tradition an
alternative may be thought of as a kind of lottery, not unlike those that are
run by various states as a way funding social programs. Such an assumption
about alternatives requires that if f is an alternative for an agent, then that
agent knows the probability pf (i) of each possible outcome i that is associated
with selecting f . If we are content with this assumption about alternatives and
are willing to further restrict our attention to those agents whose judgments
concerning the desirability of the various possible outcomes can be represented
in terms of a real-valued utility function u, then the expected utility tradition
offers a familiar standard of rationality by restricting to the class of optimization
structures for which the underlying binary relation, P , is such that (f, g) ∈ P
just in case the expected utility of f is at least as great as that of g – that is,
P , which is to be interpreted as a relation of weak preference, is such that
(f, g) ∈ P iff
￿
i∈I
pf (i)u(i) ≥
￿
i∈I
pg(i)u(i) (2.1)
for every pair of alternatives f and g.
It is worth pausing to consider some of what is presupposed in (2.1). First, as
noted above, alternatives are lotteries. In particular, for each lottery f there is
a probability distribution pf such that, for each potential outcome i ∈ I, pf (i)
is the probability that f yields i. Such a probability distribution is assumed
to represent some objective feature of the underlying lottery structure through
which it is determined. Those who are interested in the conceptual foundations
of “objective” probability – e.g., frequencies versus propensities – are urged to
consult [42]. A second presupposition in (2.1) is that both sums are well-defined.
There are various technical options as far as how to satisfy this requirement. For
example, one could restrict attention to lotteries that assign positive probability
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to only a finite number of prizes, in which case the sums at issue involve nothing
more than adding together a finite number of terms. Alternatively, one could
follow the familiar strategy of generalizing (2.1) through a theory of integration
[22]. A third presupposition in (2.1) concerns the function u that is supposed to
represent the extent to which the agent finds the possible outcomes desirable.
Since the domain of u is required to be the set of possible outcomes, (2.1)
presupposes that the desirability of a possible outcome does not depend on the
lottery under which it might be awarded. A fourth presupposition is that this
u representing the desirability of outcomes is required to be real-valued and
appropriate relative to the taking of sums and products. In particular, the
scale-type of this representation must be restricted enough to underwrite the
meaningfulness of those arithmetic operations on u that are involved in (2.1)
[41, 21, 29]. For example, if u, as a representation of the agent’s judgments of
desirability, is merely unique up to ordinal-transformations, then the expected
utility calculations in (2.1) fail to be meaningful in the sense that they depend
on an unmotivated choice of representation. Hence, the utilities in (2.1) are
assumed to be cardinal utilities, with a particular representation like u being
unique up to a positive linear transformation – in this sense it is presupposed
in (2.1) that utility, like temperature, is measureable on an interval scale.
Arguments concerning the normative relevance of the expected utility hy-
pothesis embodied in (2.1) have been offered in terms of the “law of large num-
bers” and “self-evident” axioms [32]. Apart from reactions to examples such as
those offered by Allais [1], there seems to be wide consensus for expected util-
ity maximization as the appropriate standard of rationality for decision making
under risk, i.e., those instances of decision making where the agent knows, for
each alternative, the probabilities associated with the various possible outcomes
of selecting that alternative. A significant limitation of this standard is that it
is often the case that the decision maker does not know all of the relevant
probabilities.
Cases in which the agent does not know all of the relevant probabilities
are said to involve uncertainty rather than mere risk. While various decision
rules have been suggested for decision making under uncertainty - e.g., security-
oriented rules likemaximin that received significant attention in connection with
cases of “complete ignorance” [26] – the most influential of these extend the ex-
pected utility tradition to uncertainty by introducing subjective, or personal,
probabilities in the absence of known, objective probabilities. The introduction
of subjective probabilities raises several interesting questions in the philosophy
of probability. For example, what are these subjective probabilities supposed
to represent? The standard answer, following [33] and [2], is that they rep-
resent credal states, or degrees of belief. Assuming that rational agents have
credal states, why should every potential state of that sort be representable
as a probability function? In response to such a question it is customary to
cite the Dutch book argument [33] that purports to show that agents who have
credal states that violate the suggested standard can be exploited by a clever
bookie. It is worth noting that the significance of such arguments are not only
limited by their assumptions [17] but also by the fact that they can be adapted
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to support rival positions [43]. Finally, what sorts of propositions are allowed
to be in the domain of a subjective probability? Can a rational agent assign a
degree of belief – as supposedly underwritten by the Dutch book argument – to
its own potential acts [12]? Can a rational agent assign such degrees of belief
to subjunctive conditionals [13]? Further discussion of these questions, though
interesting they might be, is beyond the scope of the present survey.
Perhaps the most influential arguments against the assumption at issue –
i.e., that every potential credal state of a rational agent can be represented by
a numerically precise probability distribution – locate the inadequacy of that
assumption in connection with the role that credal states are supposed to play
within extensions of expected utility theory to cases of uncertainty. To appre-
ciate these arguments one must consider how alternatives are understood in
the usual extensions of expected utility theory to decision making under uncer-
tainty. According such extensions, such as in the account offered by Savage, an
alternative is a function from the set of possible states of nature to the set of
possible consequences [36]. If we are willing to restrict our attention to those
agents who have a subjective probability P on the events of some distinguished
partition, I, of the set of possible states of nature, and a cardinal utility u over
the set of possible consequences, then the previously considered expected utility
hypothesis is readily extended to the class of class of optimization structures
for which the underlying binary relation, P , is such that (f, g) ∈ P just in case
the subjective expected utility of f is at least as great as that of g – that is, P ,
which is to be interpreted as a relation of weak preference, is such that
(f, g) ∈ P iff
￿
i∈I
p(i)u(f(i)) ≥
￿
i∈I
p(i)u(f(i)) (2.2)
for every pair of alternatives f and g.
It is worth pausing to consider some of what is presupposed in (2.2), in par-
ticular those presuppositions that are not salient from the discussion of (2.1)
and the expected utility approach to decision making under risk. First, it is
presupposed that there are some reasonable ways of interpreting references to
the distinguished partition, e.g, perhaps that it is maximally refined in some
sense or maybe that it defined “locally” with reference to pragmatic consid-
erations such as the decision maker’s goals. These options in turn give rise
to various questions of their own, e.g., questions concerning the existence of a
maximally refined partition or even questions concerning the stability of the
associated judgments of admissibility upon a not-necessarily-convergent series
of increasingly refined partitions [36]. Second, an alternative, or act, such as f
is required to be a function from the set of possible states of nature to the set of
possible consequences. However, in (2.2), an argument to f is an element of the
distinguished partition of the set of possible states, and of course such a thing is
a subset of the set of possible states rather than an element of it. This apparent
type-related predicament resolves to an innocent abuse of notation upon the
assumption that f is invariant along each element of the partition in the sense
that, for all i of the relevant partition and all states s, t in i, f(s) = f(t).
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Savage, as well as others, has offered axiomatic foundations for the exten-
sion of expected utility to decision making under uncertainty [22]. However,
the normative status of such extensions has been called into question by exam-
ples of the sort made famous by Ellsberg [3, 4] and to some extent anticipated
by Keynes [19] and Knight [20]. These examples purport to show instances of
rational choice, in the pre-theoretical sense, which cannot be reconciled with
Savage’s axioms or any of the other familiar axiomatizations of subjective ex-
pected utility theory. Two sorts of axioms are of particular concern. Those of
the first sort require that the agent satisfies optimization - i.e., the agent has
a complete ranking of the alternatives and is disposed to select an available
alternative that is optimal with respect to this ranking. Axioms of the second
sort are independence assumptions, similar to what can be found throughout
the general literature on additive models [21]. Roughly, in the context at is-
sue, the relevant independence assumptions can be seen as requiring that states
where f and g agree have no bearing on the agent’s preferences concerning these
acts, since if one of the states of agreement obtains then the outcome is a “sure
thing” in the sense that it does not depend on whether f or g is chosen. These
two types of conditions, ordering and independence, are of particular concern
in relation to Ellsberg-type examples because such examples are supposed to
demonstrate instances of rational choice that must violate at least one of them.
While most of the theoretical options that have been offered in light of such
examples maintain the assumption of optimization against a complete ordering
[3, 5, 8] – and thus must relax the independence requirement in order to ac-
commodate Ellsberg’s example – others have argued that the best theoretical
option is to abandon the idea that rationality is optimization against a com-
plete ranking of the alternatives [25, 37, 46, 39]. Though demonstrably outside
of the preference-based tradition of optimization – as they allow violations of
the α and β conditions that were considered previously – theories of the sort
offered by Levi [23, 25] can still be understood in terms of more general notions
of admissibility as represented by set-valued choice functions, i.e., like the C
component in the structures considered previously.
3
The previous section culminated with a brief discussion of some of the central
difficulties that are associated with extending the expected utility hypothesis
to decision making under uncertainty. In particular, difficulties associated with
the Ellsberg examples can be used to motivate various alternatives to subjec-
tive expected utility theory. These alternative accounts differ from each other in
significant ways – Levi’s account abandons the classical framework of optimiza-
tion in contrast to those accounts that accommodate Ellsberg-type examples
by relaxing independence assumptions while still remaining within the classical,
preference-based framework of optimization. Yet each of these alternative ac-
counts that are cited at the end of the previous section exploit indeterminate
probabilities, which are represented as sets of probability distributions. Early in
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the previous section it was observed that mere optimization is insufficient as a
standard of individual rational choice since it does not require any connection
between an agent’s preferences, which are the things being optimized, and that
agent’s beliefs and desires. In the expected utility tradition, a rational agent’s
beliefs and desires are representable by a numerically precise probability func-
tion and a cardinal utility function, respectively. These two functions are the
sole inputs to the decision rule of expected utility theory (2.2). Although Levi’s
account is unique among the main alternatives to subjective expected utility
theory in that it abandons optimization, each of these alternative accounts can
be seen as abandoning the Bayesian dogma that the rational agent’s belief state
can be represented by a numerically precise probability distribution. Despite
significant differences between them, these alternatives to subjective expected
utility theory each presuppose some antecedent judgment that is representable
by a set of probability distributions. This raises the question as to whether
these antecedent judgments can be motivated independently of the judgments
of admissibility that they are supposed to inform. We now turn to one such
motivation that is due to Levi but finds its roots in the pragmatist tradition of
Peirce. Thus, we begin by drawing upon Olson’s discussion in [30] and recall the
relevant part of Peirce’s philosophy, namely his injunction against roadblocks in
the path of inquiry :
Although it is better to be methodological in our investigations, and
to consider the economics of research, yet there is no positive sin
against logic in trying any theory which may come into our heads,
so long as it is adapted in such a sense as to permit the investigation
to go on unimpeded and undiscouraged . On the other hand, to set
up a philosophy which barricades the road of further advance toward
the truth is the one unpardonable offence in reasoning, as it is also
the one to which metaphysicians have in all ages shown themselves
the most addicted. (C.S Peirce)
Levi’s argument in [23] against the Bayesian orthodoxy, in particular the Bayesian
commitment to numerically precise probabilities, can be seen as rooted in his
reconstruction of Peirce’s injunction. Roughly, Levi’s argument is that the
Bayesian framework does not provide sufficiently neutral perspectives from which
the agent can entertain rival theories, e.g., the various statistical hypotheses that
are compatible with the information that the agent is given in Ellsberg-type sce-
narios. The introduction of indeterminate probabilities addressees this difficulty.
Thus, confronted with the prospect of a single random selection from an urn
that is known to be filled with exactly one hundred balls, which are identical to
each other in all respects except that some are black and some are white and
where nothing is known about the ratio of black balls to white balls in the urn,
the good Bayesian’s credal state concerning the two possible outcomes should
be representable as a numerically precise probability. Thinking of the various
candidate distributions as rival statistical hypotheses, our good Bayesian rules
out all but one of these hypotheses, the one corresponding to its subjective prob-
ability, despite the fact that each of the candidate distributions is compatible
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with all that is known about the urn. In this sense the Bayesian orthodoxy
urges a violation of Peirce’s injunction – the strict Bayesian framework blocks
paths that would allow the agent to coherently entertain statistical hypotheses
that are incompatible with its subjective probability distribution. In contrast,
the introduction of indeterminate probabilities allows for credal states – e.g.,
the one represented by the set of all candidate distributions – from which the
agent can coherently entertain the entire range of statistical hypotheses that are
consistent with what it knows about the urn.
In rejecting the requirement of numerically precise credal states, Levi, through
his decision theory, rejects the classical standard of optimization as noted pre-
viously. In this way some departures from optimization can be seen as arising
from a commitment to pragmatist philosophy. It should be noted that there
are important motivations for abandoning optimization that are not clearly re-
lated to any essential element of pragmatism. For example, Sen’s well-known
examples concerning the “epistemic value of the menu” problem can be used
to motivate rational violations of α and, thus, given the aformentioned neces-
sity of α, a rejection of optimization. Yet these departures from optimization,
much as optimization itself, can be accommodated within the wider framework
of admissibility judgments, represented formally in terms of set-valued choice
functions. In [9] I argue that such admissibility-based accounts are lacking as a
foundation for rational choice and that conditional judgments of admissibility –
represented formally in terms of poset-indexed families of the same sort of choice
functions that are used to represent unconditional judgments of admissibility –
provide a more appropriate basis for the study of rational choice. Whereas
the rational agent’s judgments of admissibility are supposed to be representable
as a set-valued choice function C in the sense that C(X) is to be interpreted
as the set of alternatives on menu X that the agent judges to be admissible,
judgments of conditional admissibility are supposed to be representable as a
conditional choice function χ in the sense that χ(e,X) is to be interpreted as
the set of alternatives on menu X that the agent judges to be admissible given e,
where e is among some partially-ordered set of potential “epistemic” states that
are antecedent to judgments of admissibility. In [9] the suggested move from
judgments of admissibility to conditional judgments of admissibility, like the
Ellsberg-inspired move from preference to admissibility that is discussed at the
end of the previous section, is apparently motivated only through a concern for
rational choice. Yet the present section recalls a sense in which Levi’s rejection
of optimization can be seen as following from his interpretation of the Peircean
injunction against placing roadblocks in the path of inquiry. This raises a ques-
tion: Can the move to conditional judgments of admissibility also be motivated
through an appeal to Peircean pragmatism? I believe that this question can be
answered in the affirmative and I will attempt to sketch the relevant motivation
in the remainder of the present article.
The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief.
I shall term this struggle Inquiry, though it must be admitted that
this is sometimes not a very apt designation.
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The irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle
to attain belief. It is certainly best for us that our beliefs should be
such as may truly guide our actions so as to satisfy our desires; and
this reflection will make us reject every belief which does not seem
to have been so formed as to insure this result. But it will only do
so by creating a doubt in the place of that belief. With the doubt,
therefore, the struggle begins, and with the cessation of doubt it
ends. (C.S. Peirce, from “The Fixation of Belief”)
What does Peirce mean in suggesting that doubt is an irritant? At vari-
ous places Peirce suggests that doubt is some sort of obstacle to action. The
following passage from [27] supports such a reading:
What is wrong with this state [doubt] is not that it is psychologically
uncomfortable, but that it leads to paralysis of action. An inquirer
has some end in view, and two different and inconsistent lines of
action present themselves, bringing action to a halt ... (C.J. Misak
from Truth and the End of Inquiry: a Peircean Account of Truth)
In addition to reminding us that Peirce’s belief-doubt model of inquiry is in-
tended as branch of logic, as opposed to a branch of psychology, Misak’s remarks
suggest that doubt, at least in the Peircean sense, interferes with some aspect
of rational decision making.
We can consider at least two ways in which doubt might interfere with an
admissibility-based account of rational decision making. Recall that according
to the sort of account at issue a decision maker’s state at time t determines a
distinguished structure of type ￿A,M, C￿, where A is a nonempty set consist-
ing of all things that could serve as alternatives, M is the set of all potential
menus from A, and C is a function that associates each menu M with a set of
admissible alternatives from M . One way in which doubt might interfere with
an admissibility-based account is if its type-level requirements – i.e., that the
decision maker’s state at t determines a distinguished structure of a particu-
lar type – fail to cohere with the relevant notion of agency. More specifically,
such interference would suggest a relevant notion of agency according to which
a decision maker’s state need not determine a distinguished structure of the
appropriate type so long as that state is not free from doubt. This kind of
interference will not be considered here, if for no other reason than that the
type-level requirements of an admissibility account are modest relative to what
is typically assumed of agents in theoretical work on rational choice. A second
way in which doubt might interfere with an admissibility-based account of ra-
tional decision making is if its proposition-level requirements – i.e., conditions
like α and β that can be construed as statements about structures that satisfy
the aforementioned type-level requirements – fail to cohere with the relevant
notion of agency. More specifically, such interference would suggest a relevant
notion of agency according to which a decision maker’s state always determines
a distinguished structure of the appropriate type but, so long as that state is not
free from doubt, the structure that it determines need not satisfy the relevant
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proposition-level requirements; e.g., in states that are not free from doubt the
associated structure may violate α. Yet how according to this picture are the
potential violations of the proposition-level requirements made salient to the
inquiring agent itself as, presumably, must be the case if doubt is to irritate in
the sense that Peirce requires? It seems that in order to make these potential vi-
olations salient to the inquiring agent itself one must assume that such an agent
is capable of making conditional judgments of admissibility – in particular, it
seems that such an agent must, at time t, be capable of judging admissibility
on the supposition that it is in a certain state that is free from doubt, be ca-
pable of judging admissibility on the supposition that it is in a certain state
that is not free from doubt, and be capable of recognizing the sense in which
the proposition-level requirements of the given admissibility-based account are
satisfied under the first supposition and violated under the second.
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